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Summary 
The rise of the Internet over the past few decades has had a massive impact on the protection 
on the protection of copyright in this new digital environment. Both international and EU 
policymakers have attempted to build a framework of copyright law which can adapt to this 
environment as well as continuing to function in the traditional one. One of the most 
significant steps toward this objective was the establishment of the exclusive right of 
communication to the public, which covers many of the actions taken in relation to IP-
protected works on the Internet. 
 
Linking holds a particular place of importance on the World Wide Web, and has become one 
of the essential building blocks that make the Internet widely accessible network of 
information and knowledge that it is today. Therefore its relationship with copyright has been 
somewhat controversial. In recent case-law, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has aimed to attain the dual objectives of settling the uncertainty surrounding the 
relationship between linking and copyright and of course doing so in such a way that affords 
adequate protection to rightholders while also respecting the special position linking holds in 
the online environment. To do so, the Court has established that linking does indeed fall 
under the right of communication to the public, but with the caveat that it will only constitute 
infringement if it reaches a ‘new public’ not contemplate by the rightholder. 
 
This rule essentially means that once a rightolder has authorised communication of their work 
on the Internet, they forfeit the right to prevent further communications of that same work 
through linking. Numerous parallels might be drawn between this new, specific rule and the 
existing, more general principle of exhaustion of right under EU law. Exhaustion has 
traditionally been excluded from application on the Internet, meaning that this similarity is 
potentially problematic. Recent case law and further analysis, however, suggests that there 
may be more scope for exhaustion online than initially believed. 
 
Nonetheless, the comparison between the linking as a communication to a new public and the 
principle of exhaustion highlights some underlying flaws in the copyright system. 
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1. Introduction 
Modern copyright law aims to be ‘technology neutral’ in response to the emergence of the 
digital age, yet the development of the copyright framework in online environments has 
shown that the transition from analogue to digital copyright protection has been far from 
seamless. This is particularly true when it applies to the practice of linking, where the 
exclusive right of communication to the public is naturally at odds with the fact that this 
particular form of communication forms such a fundamental building block that allows the 
Internet to function.   
 
The recent CJEU ruling in Nils Svensson and Others v Retreiver Sverige AB1 aims to 
establish a clear position on the legality of linking from a copyright perspective and to strike 
an appropriate balance between the protecting rights of IP owners while still respecting the 
free dissemination of content that uniquely defines the internet.  
 
While the substantive balance struck by the court in Svensson is relatively unproblematic, the 
mechanism used to reach it has raised certain questions relating to the functioning of 
copyright law on the Internet. Significant amounts of commentary have been devoted to 
discussing the effects of Svensson and in particular its ‘new public’ rule, which forms the key 
factor in this balancing act. One particular aspect of this rule which writers have alluded to is 
the potential overlap between this rule and the wider IP law principle of exhaustion. While 
some have referred to the rule as a ‘back door’ means of introducing exhaustion into online 
environments, others have dismissed the notion that they are in any way similar. Yet this 
issue has never been properly analysed on its own merits and the discussion has been paid 
little more than lip service thus far. 
 
Traditionally, policymakers have been rather adamant in their adherence to the notion that the 
principle of exhaustion does not apply in online situations. However, that the divergence of 
opinions exists suggests that we must now re-examine whether this traditional position still 
remains entirely true. 
 
                                                
1 Case C-466/12 Nils Svensson and Others v Retreiver Sverige AB [2014] ECDR 9 
2 Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
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1.1 Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this essay then is to draw a comparison between the regulation of linking set 
down by the CJEU in Svensson and the principle of exhaustion, and to examine the 
implications of such a comparison within the framework of EU copyright law more broadly. 
 
To do this, the following questions will be addressed: 
 
How does the copyright framework aim to adapt itself to online situations? 
What is the relationship between copyright and linking in particular? 
What does the ‘new public’ requirement in Svensson add to EU law, and how does it relate to 
the objectives of online copyright law more generally?  
Is there scope for the application of exhaustion online? 
To what extent might the ‘new public’ requirement be viewed as an expression of the 
exhaustion principle for linking, and why is this problematic with regards to the coherence of 
copyright law? 
 
1.2 Delimitations  
This essay is primarily focused on EU law, and is therefore not concerned with national or 
international copyright regimes. Given the pluralistic nature of the EU legal system, it is 
necessary that there will be some discussion of international instruments and national case 
law, but only to the extent that they are relevant for contextualising or otherwise further 
understanding the EU laws. 
 
Similarly, this essay will be focussed on copyright in online environments specifically, trade 
marks, patents and designs are outwith the scope of this essay except insofar as they inform 
wider principles of IP that also apply to copyright. More specifically, the focus of this essay 
is the exclusive right of communication to the public. Other rights conferred to IP holders are 
mentioned in passing, but are not fully within the scope of this essay as they do not pertain to 
linking within EU copyright law. 
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Within the context of copyright and linking, there are also specific issues relating to the 
regulation of search engines. These will not be discussed in this essay, which is concerned 
with the regulation of linking more generally.  
 
The discussion of exhaustion in particular will be within the context of the intra-European 
exhaustion that is employed under EU law. It is feasible that issues of international 
exhaustion may be relevant to discussions about the Internet, but they will not be covered in 
this essay 
 
1.3 Method and Materials 
This essay largely takes a legal positivist view of its subject matter. The law is examined as it 
currently is and how it is applied in reality. In line with this the law will be viewed alongside 
the practical factors which will affect its real world functioning. Legal norms will be analysed 
by reference to their origins and underlying principles, but ultimately assessed using an 
effect-based approach. This will allow a comparative examination of specific rules and 
principles, not only in their conceptual and normative origins, but also on the basis of their 
functional similarities and differences. 
 
This essay is written from the perspective of EU Law, both in terms of the EU copyright laws 
and exhaustion as an EU concept, and therefore employs a strictly European method. The 
pluralistic nature of the EU legal system means that other legal sources, such as international 
treaties or national case law may also have to be analysed. This will be done strictly from the 
point of view that they pertain to the development or understanding of EU law.  
 
The materials used reflect the legal dogmatic method and the hierarchy of sources within EU 
law. The analysis is based around the interpretation and application of positive EU law 
including EU legislation, in particular the so-called InfoSoc Directive,2 and CJEU case law, 
with minimal references to the recitals of relevant Directives. The international instruments 
which inform said EU legislation and case-law will also be examined. Preparatory works, 
guidelines and other ‘soft law’ materials from EU sources have not been employed. The 
                                                
2 Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, OJ 2001 L167/10  
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purpose and intent of the relevant legislation and case law is generally readily apparent and 
without ambiguity from those sources themselves, therefore the use of ‘soft’ EU instruments 
as a supplement has been deemed unnecessary. Doctrinal writings will, however, be utilised 
throughout to provide background and support this essay’s analysis. 
 
1.4 Outline 
The second chapter of this essay introduces the background of copyright in online 
environments and the agenda of technological neutrality, while the third chapter describes the 
unique features of linking which make it particularly complicated to regulate and introduces 
the general copyright issues it poses. The fourth chapter goes into greater detail on the ‘new 
public’ rule which has formed the key aspect of how linking is regulated under EU copyright 
law since the Svensson ruling, and compares this application of the rule to its origins. The 
fifth chapter discussed the principle of exhaustion, exploring its origins an underlying 
rationales before going on to analyse its position vis a vis the regulation of copyright on the 
internet. Finally, chapter six presents a comparison between the ‘new public’ rule and the 
exhaustion principle, and discusses some of the problems that the overlap may raise. 
Following this, the concluding chapter attempts to assess these issues within the wider 
scheme of the copyright framework as it has emerged throughout the essay, and talks about 
what this means for the ‘technology neutral’ objective.  
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2. Copyright on the Internet  
2.1 Background 
Technological development, particularly the rise of the Internet, has had a profound effect on 
the creation and use of literary and artistic works3, therefore it is only natural that the 
copyright laws which protect these works would have to adapt to this new environment. The 
particular nature of the Internet4 makes regulation of copyright somewhat challenging.5  
Rather than create a new framework of protection solely for this environment, IP 
policymakers have striven to adapt existing principles of copyright and authors rights to be 
‘technology neutral’6. In doing so, they aim to create a copyright framework ‘independent of 
the dynamics of technological shifts in an ever changing and dynamic media environment’.7 
 
One of the major complications relating to online distribution is that the distinction between 
the various rights conferred by copyright protection becomes somewhat unclear. For 
example, in the analogue world, the right of distribution and the right of reproduction are two 
distinct facets of copyright. In the online environment, distribution and copying are for all 
intents and purposes the same thing, which can complicate the ways in which these two 
previously distinct rights should be protected. It becomes especially problematic in cases 
where the rights are held by different people or entities.8 It is for this reason that new 
instruments have been created in order to address these problems and reframe the rights 
granted to copyright holders in a more technologically neutral manner. 
 
                                                
3 WIPO Copyright Treaty, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295166, preamble 
4 P. Samuelson, “Digital media and the law’, Communications of the ACM, (1991) Vol 34. Issue 10, pg 23 
5 V. Van Coppenhagen, “Copyright and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, with specific reference to the rights 
available in a digital environment and the protection of technological measures” (2002) 119 S African LJ 429, 
pg 430 
6 Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), Report and opinion on the making available and 
communication to the public in the internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the internet, available 
at http://www.alai.org/assets/files/resolutions/making-available-right-report-opinion.pdf 
7 ALAI report 
8 Public consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf, pg 8 
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2.2 Legislation and Treaties 
The primary instruments which aim to create this ‘technology neutral’ copyright regime are 
the WIPO Internet Treaties:9 the WCT and WPPT.10 
 
The WCT was introduced in 1996 and entered into force in 2002 in order to deal specifically 
with the rights of copyright holders in a ‘digital environment’.11 It is said to be a ‘watershed 
moment’ in international copyright law12 that has heralded a drastic shift in how copyright is 
regulated in the modern world. This Treaty, in addition to the rights already contained in the 
Berne Convention, grants authors the rights of distribution,13 rental14 and communication to 
the public.15 It also provides protection for technological measures used by authors to prevent 
unauthorised access to their works.16  
 
In the EU, these implementation of these treaties can be found in a number of pieces of 
legislation. By far the most significant of these, however, is the InfoSoc Directive.17 As such, 
this Directive and the WCT are very closely related. In accordance with the ‘technology 
neutral’ goal, this Directive covers the whole field of copyright, albeit with a ‘particular 
emphasis on the information society’.18 For that reason it can be seen as the closest thing we 
have yet seen to a unified European copyright code19 and a large step towards the goal of 
creating a technologically neutral copyright law. 
 
Other important pieces of EU legislation include Directive 2009/24/EC on the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs20 (the ‘Computer Programs Directive’), which brings 
computer programs within the scope of ‘literary works’ within the meaning of the Berne 
                                                
9 G Tritton, Tritton on Intellectual Property Law, 4th edn by R Davis et al, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014, pg 
887  
10 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=295578 
11 Summary of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 1996, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/summary_wct.html 
12 G. Dinwoodie, “The WIPO Copyright Treaty: A transition to the future of international copyright 
lawmaking?”, Case Western Reserve Law Review, (2007) Vol. 57, Issue 4, 751-766,  pg 753 
13 WCT, Article 6 
14 WCT, Article 7 
15 WCT, Article 8 
16 WCT, Article 11 
17 A Savin, EU Internet Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013, pg 124 
18 Savin, pg 125 
19 Tritton, pg 886 
20 Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ 2009 L111/16 
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Convention21 in accordance with Article 4 of the WCT, and governs their protection under 
EU copyright law. This directive takes a slightly different approach to copyright in online 
environments than the InfoSoc Directive due to its more specific subject matter. The nature, 
significance and implications of these differences will be examined in some detail in Chapter 
5. 
 
2.3 The Right of Communication 
Most discussion of copyright in online environments centres around three distinct rights: 
reproduction,22 communication to the public23 and distribution.24 Of these, the right of 
communication to the public, also known as the right of ‘making available’, is by far the most 
significant from the point of view of interned-centred discussions, to the point where it is also 
known as the ‘internet right’.25 ‘Making available’ is a broader term. ‘communication to the 
public’ is one that came about specifically for the internet,26 although its broad, technology-
neutral application is considered a ‘cornerstone of the digital agenda’.27 
 
Article 8 of the WCT provides the original expression of this right as follows: 
 
“Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 
14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall 
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by 
wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.7” 
 
At the EU level, it is found in Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, and most importantly 
Article 3(1), which states: 
 
                                                
21 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698, Article 2 
22 InfoSoc Directive, Article 2  
23 InfoSoc Directive, Article 3 
24 Tritton, pg 886 
25 ibid, pg 887 
26 ALAI report 
27 Van Coppenhagen, pg 451 
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1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way 
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. 
In essence, therefore, this is the right of copyright holders to control whether, and under what 
conditions, their works are exposed to the public eye. The ‘at a time and place individually 
chosen by them’ wording is of particular relevance to online communications, as the nature 
of the internet allows users to access online content at their own discretion and is not 
dependent on, for example, the timing of a television broadcast or the possession of a 
physical copy. Early commentators have noted that the right of communication “implies 
something more than the user being an object of distribution”28 but rather involves a degree 
of interaction.29 This means that the right of communication to the public still stands, and is 
indeed specifically tailored to situations, where there is such discretion on the part of the 
recipients of the copyright content, as is often the case on the Internet.  
 
The exact definition and scope of this right has largely been developed by the CJEU,30 with 
some guidance provided by the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive, which suggests a broad 
interpretation of Article 3 that includes all communication to the public where the public is 
not present at the source of the communication and includes any act of transmission including 
broadcasting.31  
 
2.4 Communication in the CJEU 
The landmark case in developing the communication right in Europe was Socieded General 
de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels,32 known colloquially as SGAE or 
the Spanish Hotels case. This case is not concerned with online infringement, but rather with 
the use of measures by hotel owners to make copyright-protected television programmes 
                                                
28 Van Coppenhagen, pg 439 
29 ibid 
30 Tritton, pg 897 
31 InfoSoc Directive, Recital 23 
32 Case C-306/05 Socieded General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hotels [2006] ECR I-
11519 
 12 
viewable in the hotel’s bedrooms.33 Nonetheless, it has become extremely influential in 
developing the communication right and is therefore indispensible to any analysis of 
copyright on the internet.  
 
From the case law, it has been established that ‘communication’ refers to when a work is 
“made available by a transmission in such a way that persons may access it”,34 and that it is 
not necessary for anyone to have actually accessed it (that they have the possibility to do so is 
sufficient).35 ‘Making available’ has also been said to mean ‘offering access’; it is not 
restricted to actual transmissions.36 This latter aspect once again demonstrates how perfectly 
tailored the communication right is to the online world, even coming out of a case that does 
not concern the Internet at all. The communication will be deemed to be to ‘a public’ when it 
is made to a ‘fairly large’ but indeterminate number of people.37  
 
SGAE forms the basis for all subsequent developments by the CJEU on the definition and 
scope of the communication right. Subsequent cases such as Organismos,38 Premier 
League,39 ITV Broadcasting,40 BSA,41 OSA,42 and Svensson have refined it even more43. 
Svensson will be discussed in detail in following chapters, which will examine how this right 
and other aspects of copyright protection have been developed within a more specific 
internet-based context. 
                                                
33 P. Gershlick, “ECJ rules that showing TV programmes in hotel rooms amounted to communicating broadcasts to the ‘public’ – 
SGAE v Rafael Hoteles SA, European Court of Justice”, available at  http://www.mablaw.com/2007/01/ecj-rules-that-showing-tv-
programmes-in-hotel-rooms-amounted-to-communicating-broadcasts-to-the-%E2%80%98public%E2%80%99/ 
34 Tritton, pg 898, SGAE para 43 
35 SGAE, para 43, Svensson, para 18 
36 J. C. Ginsburg and M. L. Janklow, “Hyperlinking and “Making Available””, (2014) EIPR, 36(3), 147-148, pg 
147 
37 SGAE, para 37 
38 Case C-136/09 Organismos Sillogikis Diacheirisis Dimiourgon Theatrikon kai Optikoakoustikon Ergon v 
Divani Akropolis Anonimi Xenodocheiaki kai Touristiki Etaireai [2010] ECR I-0037 
39 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others [2001] ECR I-09083 
40 Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV Catchup Ltd  
41 Case C-393/09 Bezpecnostni Softwarova Asociace – Svaz Softwarove Ochrany v Ministerstvo Kultury [2011] 
ECR 102 
42 Case C-351/12 Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. (OSA) v Léčebné lázně Mariánské 
Lázně a.s [2014] ECDR 5 
43 See also: Tritton, pp 898 – 900, for a detailed timeline of the development of the communication right in the 
CJEU 
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3. Analysis on Linking and its 
Copyright Implications 
This chapter narrows down the discussion on copyright on the Internet to the specific action 
of linking, which has been one of the more controversial talking points as a potential source 
of IP infringement. 
3.1 Introduction to Linking  
Linking is one of the fundamental features of the World Wide Web, to the point where many 
users simply consider it a straightforward part of everyday life. The terms ‘link’ and 
‘hyperlink’ are often used interchangeably, though there is a distinction to be drawn between 
‘hypertext links’ and ‘inline’ links.  
 
A hypertext link is a clickable link that, from the perspective of the user, refers them from 
one page on the Internet to another.44 The clickable portion of the link may be in the form of 
text (usually in a different colour from surrounding text in order to distinguish it) or an 
image.45 In technological terms, these links work by sending a request to the server on which 
the relevant page or file is stored and that file is then sent to the user to be accessed on their 
browser.46 Within hypertext links it is also possible to distinguish ‘reference’ or ‘surface’ 
links, which direct the user to a homepage, from ‘deep links’, which direct to a specific page 
other than the homepage within a site.47  
 
Inline linking is where image or video files are ‘displayed on the page where the link is 
placed’.48 As these types of links automatically integrate the linked content with the linking 
page, there is no need for users to click to access this content, nor is there any need for them 
to be directed away from the initial page. Many users don’t necessarily consider this to be 
‘linking’ as such, as it does not direct them away from the initial web page and it is not 
always so immediately apparent that the content is from a different source. The simplest and 
                                                
44 T. Headdon, “An epilogue to Svensson: the same old new public and the worms that didn’t turn”, (2014) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, 9(8), 662-668, pg 662 
45 E. Arezzo, “Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the Internet after 
Svensson?”, IIC 2014, 45(5), 524-555, pg 526 
46 ALAI report 
47 Arezzo, pg 526 
48 ALAI report 
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most common form of inline link is displaying images. A more obvious example of inline 
linking is embedding videos hosted on YouTube49 onto other sites.50 
 
It is possible to combine hypertext linking and inline linking, as is the case where the link is 
accessed by clicking on an image rather than text.  
 
‘Framing’ is sometimes considered a type of inline linking, in that it allows the linked content 
to be accessible from the linking page, rather than opening a new window or tab.51 It allows 
the linked content to be displayed within a ‘frame’ which makes it accessible from the initial 
web page while still being clear that it is a link to another source. This type of linking is 
commonly seen on social media where users share links with their friends or followers. 
 
Finally, one can distinguish between internal linking, where the linked content is contained 
on the same domain as the linking page, for example a home page which contains links to its 
sub-pages, and external linking, where the linked content is found elsewhere, for example the 
results on a search engine.52 There may be some overlap between the two in cases where the 
owner of a file uses an external domain to host their content and then link to it from their own 
pages, such as embedding videos they have uploaded onto YouTube. 
 
By default, any content which is placed on the Web may be accessed via a link placed on 
another page.53 Owners of web content can however set up measures to prevent or restrict 
access to content. This can reduce the effectiveness of linking by, for example, redirecting 
links to their sub pages to instead go to the homepage, thus preventing deep linking, blocking 
users from certain sites from accessing their files,54 or preventing their image files from 
displaying on other domains through inline links (often instead displaying a placeholder 
image containing a warning against such actions). On the other hand, links may be set up in 
such a way as to circumvent certain restrictions to access. The most obvious example of this 
is where one hyperlinks to a page or file that the owner for whatever reason has not made 
readily available to users on their site. Another (more widely frowned upon and explicitly 
prohibited by the WCT) example is where a link is constructed in such a way as to 
                                                
49 www.youtube.com 
50 ALAI Report 
51 Arezzo, pp 526 - 527 
52 ibid, pg 525 
53 P. Honkasalo, “Links and copyright law”, Computer Law and Security Review (2011), 258-266, pg 258 
54 ALAI Report 
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‘circumvent technological protection measures set up by the file owner’.55 While there is 
some controversy over whether linking per se is relevant from a copyright perspective, most 
agree that this latter example should constitute and infringement where IP protected content 
is concerned. 
 
While many of the functions of the Web would still be possible without links, by instead 
providing web addresses to pages and files which the user can then search themselves,56 
linking is nonetheless a fundamental feature of the Internet.57 It has streamlined the process 
of finding and accessing online content to the point where it is now widely considered 
indispensible.58 It also forms one of the essential building blocks of online locations. Internal 
linking, for example, allows users to be directed from a home page to various specific 
subpages,59 without which the notion of a ‘web site’ as a single coherent entity as opposed to 
simply a number of pages with a similar heading would be inconceivable. Additionally inline 
linking of images and other non-text content is essential for web design. External linking, 
meanwhile, becomes the connection between websites, allowing users navigate through pages 
and information in various locations and generating traffic for sites.60 Search engines, the 
primary means through which users find online content, in particular rely on linking for their 
very functioning.61  
 
3.2 Linking and Copyright 
Given how essential linking is, it would be highly problematic if it were to be outlawed or too 
stringently regulated,62 nonetheless this does not necessarily mean that there is a ‘right to 
link’ which prevents it from being subject to any legal intervention.63 Linking does therefore 
still raise certain implications for copyright and other IPR. 
 
                                                
55 ALAI Report 
56 ibid; Arezzo, pg 528 
57 Arezzo, pg 524 
58 ibid, pg 528 
59 ibid, pg 526 
60 I. Silverman, “Linking and framing: fundamental legal issues”, the Copyright & New Media Law Newsletter, 
Vol 17 (2013) Issue 2, 7-9, pg 7 
61 Arezzo, pg 524 
62 Silverman, pg 7 
63 Headon, pg 662 
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It should also be noted that linking is the main form of dissemination of information on the 
Internet, and therefore is often beneficial to the owner of said content rather than harmful. 
There have been instances where national courts have taken this into account in deciding that 
content which does not harm the IPR owner’s legitimate interest should not be punished, 
even where it might otherwise have constituted infringement.64 That being said, this rationale 
has not gained widespread support, and the CJEU has taken a different approach. 
 
3.2.1 Linking as an ‘incidental infringement’ vs linking 
as an infringement per se 
An important distinction in the discussion of linking and copyright is whether the content 
being linked to is itself infringing. Courts have consistently been more strict in regulating 
links to infringing content. In these cases the infringement that stems from the link can be 
said to be incidental to the underlying infringement. The cases where the content itself has 
been published online lawfully are arguably the purest cases of linking per se interacting with 
copyright, and therefore perhaps more crucial to the discussion on if and when linking can 
infringe IPR. This becomes very relevant in Svensson, where the distinction is drawn between 
content that is ‘freely available’,65 and that which is not. Chapter 4 of this essay will analyse 
the importance of linking as an ‘incidental’ action and the copyright implications thereof. 
 
3.2.2 The different types of linking 
A hyperlink can be copyright-relevant in two ways: where the file or page to which the user 
is directed via the link contains copyrighted material, and where the clickable text or image 
itself is subject to copyright (such as a news headline66).67 Much of the discussion 
surrounding linking and copyright, including this essay, tends to focus more on the former 
case. 
 
In cases where the original content is non-infringing, the vast majority of the discussion 
concerns external links (since linking to ones own content could not possibly be an 
infringement). Internal links only become relevant where one commits an infringement by 
                                                
64 Megakini.com v Google Spain, No 172/2012 
65 Svensson, para 32 
66 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd & Others v Meltwater Holding BV & Others [2011] EWCA Civ 890 
67 Arezzo, pg 257 
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placing protected content somewhere on one’s site. Linking internally to it from another page 
may then constitute a further infringement. 
 
One of the concerns with external linking other than surface linking is that it may cause 
confusion by leading users to believe that the page or site containing the link is the actual 
origin of the content. This was one of the issues in Svensson, where the applicants alleged 
that “if a client clicks on one of those links, it is not apparent to him that he has been 
redirected to another site”68 and in the third question the CJEU was asked whether “any 
distinction [should] be drawn between a case where the work, after the user has clicked on 
the link, is shown in such a was as to give the impression that it is appearing on the same 
website”.69 This question draws some parallels with trademark law, where likelihood of 
confusion is a key factor in establishing infringement: in this case the likelihood of confusion 
between internal and external links. This aspect of trademark law is closely related with its 
consumer protection rationale, which is much less present in copyright. In Svensson, the court 
clearly asserted that this particular factor ‘in no way alters the conclusion’70 of whether a 
particular link is infringing or not. 
 
Similarly, framing is not treated any differently from hyperlinking even where the content is 
presented as part of the ‘linkers’ own page.71 There may be some implications with regard to 
passing off or unfair competition,72 but as far as copyright infringement is concerned there is 
little practical difference. 
 
So ultimately it seems that the different kinds of links are not really relevant from a copyright 
point of view. The goal of technological neutrality means that the right of communication is 
independent of the technical measure used to make it available.73 The copyright relevance of 
links is based on the fact that they make content available, precisely how they do this is not 
part of that relevance. 
 
                                                
68 Svensson, para 8 
69 Svensson, para 13 
70 Svnesson, para 30 
71 Case C-348/13 BestWater International GmbH v Mebes; A. Moir et al., “Communication to the public: the 
CJEU finds linking to material already “freely available” cannot be restricted by copyright owners: Nils 
Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12)”, EIPR 2014, 36(6), 399-400, pg 400 
72 Moir pg 400 
73 ALAI Report 
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3.2.3 The rights in question – communication 
In more extreme cases, clicking on a link to infringing content has been deemed an 
infringement of the reproduction right,74 but under Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc directive such 
an act of ‘temporary reproduction’ is usually permissible.75 There also exists authority from 
other national jurisdictions for the view that linking does not constitute a reproduction at all.76 
 
As discussed above, most questions concerning copyright on the Internet centre around the 
‘communication to the public’ or ‘making available’ right, and linking is no exception.  
 
Art 8 of the WCT covers ‘any act’ of making a work perceptible to the public,77 so in theory 
it could include linking. Nonetheless, there has been much disagreement over whether linking 
can be considered a ‘communication to the public’ at all, and if it is under what 
circumstances. This was the position of the European Copyright Society, whose Opinion on 
Svensson concludes that “if hyperlinking is regarded as communication to the public, all 
hyperlinks would need to be expressly licensed. In our view, that position is absurd.”.78 It is 
apparent that requiring the authorisation of the IPR holder for each and every link to their 
protected content would not be feasible, given the status of linking as something of an 
‘essential facility79’ of the Internet. 
 
In the national courts, this was first addressed in the Shetland Times80 case, prior to the entry 
into force of the WCT and the InfoSoc Directive. It is readily apparent that the court in this 
case was not prepared to deal with analysing copyright law from an internet-based 
perspective, and ultimately took the view that a website should be regarded as a cable 
programme within the meaning of s7(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
Linking to such content was therefore at least grounds for the granting of an interim 
injunction. This approach is regarded as the equivalent of what would now be regarded as a 
‘communication to the public’.81   
                                                
74 NLA v Meltwater 
75 Hokasalo, pg 258 
76 Algemeen Dagblad BV/Eureka Internetdiensten (Kranten.Com), 2002 ECDR 1, p 13 (Neth) 
77 ALAI Report 
78 L. A. F. Bently et al,  “European Copyright Society Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 
Svensson”, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220326, pg 16 
79 Arezzo, pg 525 
80 Shetland Times Ltd v Wills, 1997 SC 316 
81 Honkasalo, og 259 
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An alternative view was taken by the German courts in Paperboy,82 which held, on similar 
facts to Svensson, that “normal linkage does not infringe any of the exclusive rights of the 
right holder, provided that the destination anchor of the link is not itself illegal”.83 Linking is 
not regarded as a communication to the public as merely facilitates pre-existing access.84 
Similarly, in Canada the Federal Court has held that linking does not constitute copyright 
infringement where the content itself is not infringing.85  
 
3.2.4 Linking as communication – the CJEU’s 
approach 
 
While the appropriateness of classifying a link as a ‘communication to the public’ might be 
debated86, recent case-law from the CJEU has made its position on the matter quite clear. 
 
Decided in early 2014, Svensson has quickly become the leading case on the legality of 
linking from a copyright perspective. Mr Svensson, along with his fellow applicants, was a 
journalist whose articles were published in Göteborgs-Posten (GP), both in newspapers and 
online. The defendant was a website operator whose site offered users links to various news 
articles found throughout the web, including to Mr Svensson’s articles in GP. Mr Svensson 
and company alleged that in doing so, Retriever Sverige had made these articles available to 
its users and therefore infringed the authors exclusive right of communication to the public.87 
 
The Court in this case applied a two part test: stating that the communication right consists of 
the ‘act of communication’ and the ‘public’ to whom the communication is being made as 
cumulative criteria.88  
 
In the first part of the test, the CJEU settled the controversial question over whether linking 
constitutes an ‘act of communication’, pointing out that a link to protected content ‘affords 
                                                
82 BGH I ZR 259/00  
83 Honkasolo, see note 15 
84 ibid, pg 260, citing Paperboy pp 42-43 
85 Silverman, pg 7  
86 EU Law Radar, “Case C-466/12, Svensson – hyperlinks and communicating works to the public”, available at 
http://eulawradar.com/case-c-46612-svensson-hyperlinks-and-communicating-works-to-the-public/ 
87 Svensson, para 8 
88 Svensson, para 16, citing ITV Broadcasting 
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users of [the site on which the link is placed] direct access to those works’.89 Given the broad 
construction of ‘act of communication’, as it is written in Article 3(1), which the Court had 
previously deemed appropriate in order to ensure a high level of protection for copyright 
owners,90 this led to the conclusion that the provision of links does indeed constitute an ‘act 
of communication’.91     
 
In the second part of the test, the Court looks at the requirement that the ‘act of 
communication’ is made to a ‘public’. The existing definition of a ‘public’ for the purposes of 
Article 3(1) under CJEU jurisprudence stipulates that the ‘public’ must constitute and 
indeterminate, and fairly large number of potential recipients of the protected content,92 
which is clearly the case when a link is made available to all the potential users of a web 
site.93 While the Court could have simply left it there, it instead went on to qualify this 
reasoning by adding an additional ‘sub-criterion’ to this part of the test by stipulating that the 
communication must be directed specifically at a ‘new public’ which was not taken into 
account by the copyright holder when they initially published the content.94 Chapter 3 of this 
essay will examine the ‘new public’ requirement specifically in greater detail. 
 
The subsequent BestWater case follows the approach taken by the CJEU in Svensson. This 
case concerns framing rather than providing a clickable hyperlink. As mentioned above, the 
technology neutral approach means that the different types of links pose the same copyright 
issues, and therefore this case was treated in the same way as Svensson. As BestWater’s 
video was freely available to all Internet users on YouTube, the embedding of the content on 
the defendant’s website did not reach any sort of ‘new public’ and was therefore not deemed 
to be an infringement.95 
 
The Svensson approach has not been without its controversy, the issue being that it seems to 
take for granted that linking is a communication and doesn’t really give a whole lot of 
analysis and justification for it96, ignoring the concerns of the likes of the European 
                                                
89 Svensson, para 18 
90 Svensson, para 17, citing previous cases. 
91 Svensson, para 20 
92 Svensson, para 21, citing previous cases 
93 Svensson, paras 22-23 
94 Svensson, para 24 
95 BestWater, para 19 
96 Arezzo, pg 539 
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Copyright Society and commentators. For better or worse, however, this is indisputably the 
position of EU copyright law as it currently stands, and therefore our analysis must proceed 
on the assumption that linking does, indeed, constitute a communication to the public.  
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4. The ‘New Public’ Requirement 
In this chapter we will examine and analyse the ‘new public’ criterion as it emerged from 
Svensson. This will be done firstly by examining the development of the prior case law 
relating to the ‘new public’, then by comparing this with Svensson’s application of the rule, 
and finally by exploring the implications thereof.  This requirement is probably the most 
notable aspect of the judgement as it effectively qualifies the right to communication to the 
public in a way that was not necessarily anticipated by the legislation. 
 
4.1 New Public Rule 
The ‘new public’ requirement is a particularly European concept. It was created by the CJEU 
as part of its ongoing interpretation and development of the communication right as it is 
contained in Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc directive. The rule stipulates that for there to be a 
‘communication to the public’ for the purposes of copyright infringement, that 
communication must not only be made to any ‘public’, within the definition used by the 
CJEU, but it must also be a public that was not taken into account by the copyright holder at 
the time when they authorised the original communication of the work. 
 
The notion of the ‘new public’ is not entirely novel to Svensson, but it its this case that 
solidified its position as a limitation on the communication right, and its relevance in online 
situations.  
 
4.2 Origin and Development 
4.2.1 Historical Development 
The first mention of the ‘new public’ in CJEU case law was in the SGAE case, where it was 
defined as ‘a public different from the public at which the original act of communication of 
the work is directed’.97  
 
                                                
97 SGAE, para 40 
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In this case, the public that the copyright owner had intended to receive the initial 
communication can be quite clearly defined as those who own or otherwise lawfully have 
access to the reception equipment which can receive the broadcasts of the protected content.98 
Therefore, the clientele of a hotel constitute a new public which was not in contemplation of 
the copyright holder when they authorised the initial broadcast.99 This version of the ‘new 
public’ criterion serves to strengthen the copyright holders degree of protection. By dividing 
up the ‘public’ in such a way, the exclusive right of ‘communication to the public’ can be 
separated into multiple acts of communication, each of which must be individually authorised 
by the copyright owner. 
 
Over time, the ‘new public’ rule has become a standard feature of CJEU case law regarding 
potential infringements of the communication right. Premier League100 applies the ‘new 
public’ criterion in the same manner as SAGE. In Airfield NV,101 the court held that one 
communicates a work to a ‘new public’ when one “expands the circle of persons having 
access to the [protected work]”.102 
   
ITV Broadcasting represents the first significant development in how the ‘new public’ rule is 
applied since SGAE. In this case, the alleged infringers, TVC, ensured that the content 
broadcast on their streaming service could only be accessed by viewers who were legally 
entitled to watch said content in the United Kingdom by virtue of their television license.103 
The issue in this case was that, unlike in SGAE and other previous cases, it was not 
immediately apparent that there was a ‘new public’ as the streams were only made available 
to those already entitled to watch the content on television.104 The ‘circle of persons having 
access’ therefore was unchanged. Nonetheless the CJEU held that, since it is apparent that the 
InfoSoc Directive intended that each transmission of a work through a different specific 
technical means should be individually authorised by the rightholder,105 the streaming online 
of terrestrial television programmes must be considered a ‘communication to the public’106 
                                                
98 SGAE, para 41 
99 SGAE, para 42 
100 Premier League, para 197  
101 Joined cases C-431/09 and C-432/09 Airfield NV, Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) [2011] ECR I-9363 
102 Airfield NV, para 77 
103 ITV Broadcasting, para 10 
104 ITV Broadcasting, para 37 
105 ITV Broadcasting, para 24 
106 ITV Broadcasting 
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even where that public is made up of the same people as the recipients of the initial 
broadcast.107 
 
In terms of the development of the ‘new public’ rule, this case can be viewed in two ways. 
One view is that the ‘new public’ requirement is dispensed with in cases which concern 
communications by different technical means.108 This is consistent with the wording of the 
ITV Broadcasting judgement, in which the CJEU states that the ‘new public’ is “not 
relevant”109 in such cases. Another, perhaps more convoluted, view is that the ‘technical 
means’ forms an additional factor to the ‘new public’ rule, which is to say that 
communicating the public through a different technical means is another form of ‘new 
public’, and the rule is not only defined by reference to the people who make up the public.110  
  
4.2.2 How is Svensson different? 
It is notable that the cases concerning the ‘new public’ in the past have largely turned around 
similar facts relating to television broadcasts. One of the primary reasons why Svensson is 
considered a landmark case is that it is the first to incorporate this rule into a wholly (as 
opposed to the partially-online situation in ITV Broadcasting) online context. This case is 
therefore the perfect opportunity to put the ‘technology-neutral’ qualities of this particular 
aspect of the communication right to the test. Since this case is exclusively concerned with 
online communications, both within the initial communication and the ‘new’ communication, 
the issue of separate technical means as in ITV Broadcasting does not arise.  
 
In this case the CJEU defines the ‘new public’ rule, in similar terms to the previous cases 
which it refers to as “settled case-law”,111 as “a public that was not taken into account by the 
copyright holders when they authorised the initial communication to the public”.112 It is 
apparent from this that the Court certainly intended their application of the rule in this case to 
be a continuation of that which was developed in earlier cases. Further analysis, however, 
makes it clear that while the ‘new public’ in Svensson appears prima facie similar to the 
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previous version of the rule, its effects on the scope and nature of the communication right 
are rather drastically different. 
 
The judgement in Svensson ultimately was there was no ‘new public’ in this case as Mr 
Svensson had already placed his work on a freely accessible website, meaning that any 
internet users could access it at a time and place chosen by them if they so wished, and 
therefore all internet users were part of the public contemplated by Mr Svensson when he 
authorised his works for online publication.113 When content is made freely available, it is 
deemed to have been communicated to anyone who may have access to it, which is to say 
anyone who has access to the Internet, regardless of whether they actually do access the 
content. This makes it very difficult to communicate to a ‘new public’ of Internet users.  If 
the ‘initial public’ means users of the Internet generally, then that effectively includes 
everyone who has access or might at some point have access to the Internet. The simple fact 
then is for the vast majority of linking cases the ‘new public’ will not exist by virtue of the 
fact that the ‘initial public’ already includes everyone.114  
 
Looking from the starting point that linking is a communication to the public, and therefore 
within the exclusive rights of the copyright holder, the ‘new public’ requirement massively 
narrows the scope of the communication right with respect to links. The reason for this is that 
the ‘new public’ relates very closely to the premise that the public can be fragmented. In 
SGAE, for example, the public could clearly be divided between those who own the 
technology to receive the broadcast of the copyrighted works and those who do not. The ‘new 
public’ requirement gave legal force to this factual distinction by granting the rightholder the 
ability to control the initial communication to each fragment on a separate basis, with the 
trade-off that they can no longer control subsequent communications within one of those 
fragments after they have made use of this right initially. With regards to linking, on the other 
hand, it is impossible to divide the public when everyone has the ability to access the initial 
communication. If the public cannot be factually divided, then the aspect of the ‘new public’ 
requirement that gives legal force to the division becomes meaningless. Therefore the trade 
off of losing the right to control subsequent re-communications within an initial public and 
                                                
113 Svensson, para 26; Headdon, pg 664 
114 Of course ‘everyone’ is perhaps a misnomer, as those without Internet access would not be part of the initial 
public in this case, but their since lack of Internet access also means that they cannot receive communications 
through linking there is no way they could form a ‘new public’ either. These people are therefore entirely 
outwith the scope of this analysis. 
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having greater control over initial communications to different parts of the public disappears, 
and only the loss of protection (compared to a situation where linking is considered a 
‘communication to the public’ but not subject to the ‘new public’ requirement) remains.  
 
The large degree of difference between the two situations highlights why the ‘new public’ 
criterion in Svensson in particular is so significant: it is not simply the case that an existing 
rule can be applied to both situations, the particularities of online communication have forced 
it to evolve into something rather substantially different from what it was in SGAE, to the 
point where it actually has the opposite effect on the degree of copyright protection. Two 
conclusions can be taken from this: firstly, that the ‘new public’ rule is not technology 
neutral, and secondly that its application in Svensson constitutes a de facto novel addition to 
EU copyright law. 
 
4.3 When is there a ‘new public’?  
By definition, the idea of a ‘new public’ presumes the existence of an ‘old’ or ‘existing’ 
public. Therefore, communication to a ‘new public’ will usually mean that there has been an 
existing communication. In the cases from which the rule evolves, the act of ‘communication 
to a new public’ itself is incidental to the initial act of communication: In SGAE the initial 
communication was the broadcast of television programmes to the owners of the appropriate 
reception equipment115 and the incidental communication was the transmission of said 
broadcast into the hotel bedrooms.116 In ITV Broadcasting, the initial communication was the 
terrestrial broadcast of television shows and the incidental communication was the streaming 
of those broadcasts online. In Svensson, the initial communication was the posting of articles 
on the GP website and the incidental communication was the linking to those articles from 
Retriever Sverige’s site. In these cases, for there to be a ‘new public’ it seems there must be 
an incidental communication, and that there also must be something particular about said 
incidental communication to substantially distinguish it from the initial communication. 
 
While it was clear that a ‘new public’ was not present, and could not be present on the facts 
of Svensson, this should not be taken to necessarily mean that there can never be a ‘new 
                                                
115 SGAE, para 41 
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public’ in linking cases.117 If there are additional factors present in the relevant 
communications, then it is possible that a link can reach a ‘new public’. This is important to 
remember as the fact that the vast majority of links will not constitute a ‘communication to a 
new public’ would make their very classification as a ‘communication to the public’ appear 
redundant. The existence of these exceptions means that the application of the rule to linking 
does make normative sense, even if their scope and effectiveness is actually very small.  
  
There are three main situations where linking may constitute ‘communication to a new 
public’. 
 
4.3.1 When the link is used to circumvent blocking 
measures 
The CJEU points out in Svensson that there is likely to be a ‘new public’ where a clickable 
link enables users to bypass measures designed to restrict access to the original site on which 
the content was posted, as such a link would “[constitute] an intervention without which 
those users would not be able to access the works transmitted”.118 
 
In Svensson, both parties agreed that the protected content was ‘freely available’ to all 
Internet users, to which the CJEU frequently referred when giving its judgement.119 What this 
effectively means is that communication to a ‘new public’ is impossible since the initial 
public already includes everyone that the new public possibly could. The relevance of the 
‘new public’ rule with respect to linking then is largely confined to situations where the link 
is used as a means of circumventing protection measures. 
  
Effectively, if there are measures put in place to restrict access to copyright content, this 
means that the rightholder has intended to limit the number of people who have access to said 
content. For example, a login screen which restricts access to those who have signed up to the 
website, possibly including payment.120 Unlike in the case where the content is freely 
available, the ‘initial public’ no longer includes everyone, so the existence of a ‘new public’ 
once again becomes possible. A link which aims to get around these restrictions would make 
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it possible for internet users who are not members of the initial public to gain access to 
content which they would otherwise not be able to.121 This would be ‘communication to a 
new public’, meaning that the permission of the copyright holder would be required122 or else 
it would constitute an infringement. 
 
This is another example of how the ‘new public’ rule makes the law follow the facts: the 
legal restriction on linking is closely intertwined with the technical restriction, as the former 
is only present when the latter is.123 Rather than providing a distinct area of protection, then, 
this rule simply grants legal backing de facto protections that already exist. 
 
It is here that the weakness of the protection afforded by Svensson to these situations begins 
to become apparent, not because it is simply an enforcement of practical protection but 
because in that capacity it is largely redundant. Emanuela Arezzo notes that using linking as a 
means to circumvent blocking measures would constitute an infringement anyway even in the 
absence of the Svensson ruling, as the “mere act of circumvention of a technological 
protection measure placed to protect the copyright content”124 is explicitly outlawed by both 
the WCT125 the InfoSoc Directive.126 
 
4.3.2 When the initial communication was 
unauthorised 
Our analysis of the ‘new public’ criterion so far has largely counted on the notion that the 
initial communication was made legitimately, ie. made or authorised by the copyright holder. 
In those situations, we can clearly see how the secondary communication itself is treated for 
the purposes of assessing copyright infringement. However, there also exist situations where 
the secondary communication is also the secondary infringement, as the initial 
communication itself was made without the consent of the right holder. These situations may 
also constitute a case where ‘communication to a new public’ is considered to be present. 
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The rationale here is that the ‘initial public’ is only valid if the initial communication is 
authorised. The definition of the ‘new public’ relies on a public that the rightholder did not 
have in contemplation when they authorised the initial communication, then it follows that if 
the rightholder did not authorise the initial communication, then they cannot possibly have 
had any public in contemplation. Since there is no initial public, any public to which 
subsequent communications are made must be regarded as a ‘new public’ and “then all acts 
of communication to a public must be infringements”.127 
 
This aspect of the rule is not novel to linking, but has also been present in the commentary 
surrounding SGAE. While this issue is not expressly covered in the case itself, writers have 
regarded it as “the only realistic interpretation”.128 This same rationale seems to remain 
relevant in Svensson, in which the CJEU “clearly states that the authority of the rightholder is 
key”.129 
 
Commentary on recent case law does perhaps cast doubt on this interpretation, with some 
commentators appearing to take the view that BestWater is authority for the proposition that 
linking to any freely available content, even where said content was made available 
unlawfully, is not an infringement as the incidental communication does not communicate it 
to a ‘new public’.130 In that case, the copyright holder asserted that the initial communication 
was made without their consent131, yet the CJEU did not seem to regard this as relevant.132 
Ruth Hoy disputes this assessment, pointing out the importance of the authorisation of the 
rightholder in Svensson’s definition of the ‘new public’. In her view “the CJEU does seem to 
only say in BestWater that linking to freely available content will not be a communication to 
a ‘new public’ where the copyright owners have allowed the original communication. It 
follows that linking to or embedding to content that was originally posted without the 
authorisation of the right holder should constitute infringement”.133  
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While the court has not definitively addressed this issue, it does seem likely that linking to 
content which has been made available illegally does indeed constitute an infringement, 
albeit in a somewhat different manner from the point of view of the ‘new public’ rule. This is 
a rather different situation from the previous analysis whereby it was the particular 
circumstances of the incidental communication which led to it communicating the work to a 
‘new public’, either by widening the circle of people who have access to the content or by 
granting them access through a different technical means, thereby resulting in an 
infringement. In this situation the incidental communication is no different than it was in 
Svensson itself, but rather it is the particularities of the original communication that give rise 
to the infringement. The incidental communication is guilty by association. Rather than an 
natural result of the ‘new public’ rule, this is perhaps more analogous to the orthodox 
interpretation of ITV Broadcasting in that it allows the ‘new public’ to be dispensed with due 
to other circumstances which justify prohibiting the alleged infringer’s conduct. 
 
4.3.3 Where initial authorisation is revoked 
A related but distinct situation is where content is made freely available online with the 
authorisation of the rightholder, but then subsequently removed or made subject to blocking 
measures. The Court in Svensson referred specifically to this as an example of where a link 
would constitute an intervention without which users would not be able to access the relevant 
content.134 This is, in theory, something of a concern for those who support greater freedom 
on the internet and for linking in particular, since it can mean that a link which is lawful one 
day may cease to be such the next day without any notice.135 This problem is should not be 
overstated though, since the technical realities of linking mean that a link placed to content 
which is no longer readily available will simply become a ‘dead’ link, ie. not return any result 
when clicked, rather than directing the user to the content in an infringing manner.136 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
It can be said that the protection afforded by classifying linking as a communication is, from 
a practical standpoint, actually quite weak. In the rare, exceptional cases in which the ‘new 
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public’ rule does not preclude the link from being viewed as an infringement, it is more often 
than not redundant. Looking back on the earlier discussion of linking as an infringement per 
se vs. linking as an incidental infringement, the current EU framework means that the ‘new 
public’ rule only really accounts for the latter. Legally, there does not appear to be much 
distinction, but from a factual perspective, the ‘new public’ rule means that linking can only 
really be deemed an infringement when it is incidental to an existing infringement, either 
from the third party who places content online illegally or continues to maintain it online 
after it has been taken down by the rightholder, or from the person posting the link in 
circumventing blocking measures. 
 
The right of communication to the public insofar as it pertains to linking has not only been 
officially recognised by the CJEU, but at the same time has been drastically qualified, to the 
point where the exception is vastly stronger than the rule 
 
The obvious goal of the CJEU in this case is to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
right holders and the freedom of Internet users. The balance they reach is from a practical 
very pro-user, but is reached in a very roundabout way that seems to come from a more pro-
rightholder stance. This leads to a somewhat curious situation in which, by coming to the 
rather controversial view that linking is a ‘communication to the public’, the CJEU has in 
practical terms reached a result that would be more satisfactory to those who advocated 
against linking being deemed copyright-relevant than those who were in favour of it. 
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5. Analysis of Exhaustion 
In order to make a thorough comparison between the ‘new public’ requirement and the 
principle of exhaustion, we must also examine the facets and rationales behind exhaustion in 
greater detail. This chapter takes a step away from the discussion on linking, and will look at 
the principle of exhaustion as it currently exists in EU law.  
 
5.1 What is it? Basic Intro 
“By this act [of putting a product on the domestic market], the effect of the protection 
afforded conferred by the [IPR] is exhausted. The proprietor who has manufactured the 
product and has put it in the market under this protection which excludes competition from 
other parties, has enjoyed advantages which the [IPR] confers upon him and has thus 
exhausted his right.”137 
 
When a product has been placed on the market within the EU, or any other relevant territory, 
the owner of IPR connected to that product cannot use their IPR to restrict further sale of that 
product anywhere within that territory. This is because their IPR is held to be ‘exhausted’.138 
 
The principle of exhaustion, also known as the ‘first sale doctrine’139 or the doctrine of 
consent140 serves as a restriction on the practical scope of IPR. This doctrine is what makes it 
possible to resell items which are protected by IPR, such copies of books, films and other 
copyrighted materials or products made with patented technologies. It is integral to the 
functioning of ‘second hand’ markets,141 as well as parallel trade. 
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Bellamy and Child summarises the jurisprudence of the CJEU and defines two conditions for 
the application of exhaustion: that the goods are put on the market, and that the IPR holder 
consented to the goods being put on the market.142 
 
5.2 Why does it exist? Origins and justification  
The principle of exhaustion is recognised in numerous legal systems, each with its own 
rationale and conception of the doctrine. This section will look at a few of these various 
views on exhaustion, paying particular attention to its origins and rational within the EU legal 
system. In national systems, it has typically been justified through the property law 
rationale,143 while in some it is linked more closely with the notion of Implied License. In EU 
law, the exhaustion doctrine developed as part of the Internal Market law. 
 
5.2.1 Property Law 
The property law justification for exhaustion generally does not operate as a distinct rationale 
for the doctrine’s existence, rather it can be found in almost all legal systems which recognise 
exhaustion and operates alongside other justifications. The precise nature of the property law 
rationale can vary with differing systems of property, but the general basis of it is that the 
right of ownership of an item includes the right to dispose of that item however the owner 
may choose, particularly by selling it. This naturally conflicts with the IPR owners exclusive 
right of distribution and therefor exhaustion exists as a way or reconciling the two. 
 
Analysis of the property view of exhaustion tends to emphasise the distinction between the IP 
protected material and the goods in which they are contained in order to highlight their 
separate ownership:144 the text of a novel belongs to the author, the paper and ink belong to 
the store, library or consumer. 
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5.2.2 Implied License 
In some legal systems such as the UK,145 exhaustion has been linked to the notion of Implied 
License, where putting the product on the market for the first time is taken as tacit consent for 
the further circulation of that item. This notion of exhaustion dates back to 1817 case of Betts 
v Willmott.146 It is somewhat linked to the property law view in that it is based on the 
presumption that once someone has purchased an item they obtain the right to do with it what 
they wish,147 but goes further by asserting that because of this presumption the IPR holder 
must therefore be clear and explicit to justify a claim that they have not given a license to the 
seller to do so.148 
 
This view of exhaustion has the potential to be broader than the property law based 
conception, since it is not necessarily liked to ownership it can cover other rights than just 
sale and distribution, such as the right of communication. Although this analysis is purely 
theoretical, and there has yet to be a case that has used the implied license reasoning to apply 
exhaustion in such a way. 
 
5.2.3 Internal Market 
Within the EU, the doctrine of exhaustion arose through the application of the right to free 
movement to applications of IP rights which were perceived to be unduly restrictive of the 
four freedoms, particularly free movement of goods. It is an attempt at a compromise 
between the functioning of the internal market with the upholding of the exclusive rights of 
intellectual property holders. 
 
Exhaustion as an EU concept was developed by the CJEU through a series of cases, most 
significantly Deutsche Grammophon149 and Centrafarm. It is often discussed as part of a 
trifecta of principles alongside existence vs. exercise and specific subject matter.150 While the 
notion of existence vs. exercise had already existed within the EU in relation to Article 101 
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TFEU,151 Deutsche Grammophon was the first case to apply it in connection to Article 34.152 
Therefore, the internal market view of exhaustion can be seen to be very closely linked to the 
notion of existence vs. exercise.  
 
Under Article 34 TFEU, restrictions on the free movement of goods within the internal 
market are prohibited, subject to certain justifications. This can be somewhat problematic 
when it comes to the application of IPR. (Certain Treaty provisions make it clear that EU 
Law is not competent to interfere with property rights including IPR). In an attempt to 
alleviate this conflict the CJEU in Consten and Grundig created the existence vs. exercise 
doctrine, which stipulates that while the EU may not rule on the questions of the existence of 
IPR, it may regulate their exercise in order to ensure that EU law is upheld. It is on the basis 
of this distinction that the CJEU were able to introduce exhaustion to EU law.153 
 
The notion of EU-wide exhaustion as opposed to the national exhaustion which already 
existed in many EU Member States is crucial to the principle of exhaustion as an EU concept, 
as its main objective is to prevent the fragmentation of markets. In Deutsche Grammophon, 
the Court notes that “it would be in conflict with the provisions prescribing the free 
movement of products within the common market for a manufacturer of sound recordings to 
exercise the exclusive right to distribute the protected articles, conferred upon him by the 
legislation of a member state, in such a way as to prohibit the sale in that state of products 
placed on the market by him or with his consent in another member state solely because such 
distribution did not occur within the territory of the first member state.”154 
 
Where a patentee, or other IPR holder, can put the product on the market for the first time, a 
restriction of its further circulation is not necessary to ensure to ‘guarantee the essence of the 
exclusive rights flowing from the parallel patents’155. This rationale fits with the conception 
of intellectual property as a ‘moral right’ and a ‘right to remuneration’, in that having the 
exclusive right to place the product on the market for the first time and to be remunerated for 
the first sale is deemed sufficient in order for the IPR to be recognised as the creator of their 
work and to obtain remuneration suitable to their effort in creating it. However, the ability to 
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further restrict circulation of the product on the second hand market goes beyond what is 
necessary to ensure that the IPR holders moral and economic rights are recognised and in fact 
would lead to double benefits156. This is problematic in itself as it goes beyond what is 
considered ‘fair remuneration’, but also clearly constitutes a disproportionate restraint on 
trade within the internal market. 
 
5.3 Exhaustion on the Internet. 
5.3.1 Generally 
As with many things related to copyright law, the doctrine of exhaustion has had to be re-
examined in light of the rise of the Internet as a means of communicating and distributing 
protected materials. 
 
The default position is that the principle of exhaustion does not apply to the distribution of 
digital goods.157 What this means in practice is that the right holder retains control of every 
communication of their work, even between users after it has been placed on the market.158 
The consequence of this is that there cannot be a second-hand market for goods distributed 
digitally.159 
 
Much of the issue with the application of exhaustion to digital forms of distribution is the 
practical differences compared to analogue copies. A physical item can only exist in one 
place at one time, and remains a single item no matter how long it has been in distribution. 
Digital goods meanwhile are not distributed by passing from one person to another, but rather 
by copying their data from one device or server to another.160 From a copyright perspective 
this means that distribution and reproduction are, for all intents and purposes, the same thing, 
and while the exclusive right of distribution may be subject to exhaustion, the right of 
reproduction is not. 
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Since the transfer of ownership of physical copies is not at issue online, it naturally follows 
that the ‘first sale’ doctrine cannot logically apply. Indeed this does seem to be the approach 
taken by the EU legislators in drafting the InfoSoc Directive, which states explicitly that the 
exclusive right of communication will not be exhausted.161 The recitals to said Directive state 
that exhaustion does not apply to ‘on-line services’, and draws distinction between online 
distribution and CD-ROMs in which the IP is contained in a tangible medium.162 
  
The justification for this appears to be based on the notion that copyrighted works distributed 
over the internet are not ‘sold’ as such, as there is no transfer of property of a tangible item, 
but rather made available under license.163 This distinction can feel somewhat artificial from 
certain perspectives, particularly as it regards consumer products such as books or music: few 
people will see paying to download an album as opposed to buying it on CD as a 
substantially different transaction. The Advocate General in the UsedSoft case also notes that 
this distinction makes it very easy to circumvent the principle of exhaustion simply by 
structuring transactions as licenses rather than sales.164  
 
The property law view of the exhaustion principle supports this rationale. It draws a 
distinction between the IPR and the physical object in which is its contained.165 It is the 
ownership rights in the physical object that exhaust the IPR. Without those rights, there is no 
conflicting right for the IPR to be balanced against so exhaustion is not needed. 
 
The primary distinction for the applicability of the exhaustion principle is therefore 
tangibility.166 
 
This tangibility requirement can be considered problematic as more and more media move 
from analogue to digital distribution: music downloads can be considered the successor to 
CDs in the same way that CDs are the successor to cassette tapes and vinyl records. From that 
perspective, treating downloads differently than other forms of distribution may seem 
functionally arbitrary. 
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Another issue with this approach is that while it is in line with the property law view of 
exhaustion, it does not fit quite so neatly with other conceptions of the principle. In particular, 
exhaustion at an EU level was not based on property law at all, but rather was coined by the 
courts to prevent IPR from being used to partition of markets. If such a restriction on the 
circulation of physical goods is considered an unjustified restriction on free trade, it naturally 
follows that the same restriction on digital goods (which, as mentioned above, are often 
considered to be functionally the same thing by consumers) is equally inappropriate. This 
particular issue is not unique to exhaustion on the Internet. The case of Merck v 
Primecrown167 has been criticised for “[elevating] the principle of [exhaustion] to a cast-iron 
hard principle without due regard to its origins”.168 Therefore it would appear that there is a 
rather pervasive discord between the origins and rationales behind the principle of exhaustion 
and its current application within the EU. 
 
Despite this, there has been a clear consensus among legislators, at international and EU 
levels that the tangibility requirement should be abided by and that exhaustion does not apply 
online. The Agreed Statements on Articles 6 and 7 of the WCT that the term ‘copy’ being 
subject to the right of distribution (and therefore potentially to exhaustion) refers exclusively 
to ‘fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects’.169 Similarly, the recitals 
to the InfoSoc Directive states that the right of distribution relates to works incorporated in a 
‘tangible article’170 while explicitly excluding the application of exhaustion to ‘on-line 
services’.171 On the whole, it seems to be very widely taken for granted that exhaustion 
should not, and therefore does not, apply online. 
 
More recently, however, certain exceptions to this rule have popped up which may suggest 
there might be justification in principle for the wider application of the exhaustion principle 
online after all. 
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5.3.2 The first-download principle - UsedSoft 
One of the earliest and most notable examples of exhaustion making its way into online 
transactions can be seen in the case of UsedSoft v Oracle International172 in which the CJEU 
created what has come to be known as the ‘first-download doctrine’. This rule relates 
specifically to software rather than copyrighted materials online generally, which the Court 
holds is governed not by the InfoSoc Directive, but by the Computer Programs Directive. 
Nonetheless, the Computer Programs Directive provides that Computer Programs shall be 
protected by copyright ‘as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention’,173 
therefore the various principles of copyright law may be seen through its application.  
  
Unlike the other instruments relating to copyright on the Internet, exhaustion is included in 
the Computer Programs Directive. Article 4(1) of this Directive explicitly states that the first 
sale of a copy of a computer program within the EU will exhaust the copyright holders 
distribution right in that copy. 
 
One of the most interesting parts of this judgement rides on the interpretation of the word 
‘copy’. From a basic reading of the word it would seem that this Article is intended to apply 
the principle of exhaustion in the conventional manner including the requirement of 
tangibility, in line with WCT and by the InfoSoc Directive, as discussed above. In addition 
the UsedSoft case notes that the drafters of the Directive probably did not intend to regulate 
or contemplate online distribution of computer programs.174 
 
In this case, however, the CJEU points out that Article 4(2) the Computer Programs Directive 
does not actually draw a distinction between tangible and intangible copies, and there is 
therefore no reason to assume that the provision is limited to CD-ROM or DVD copies.175 
The justification for this diverging interpretation is that the Computer Programs Directive 
constitutes a lex specialis in relation to the IndoSoc Directive,176 yet there seems little reason 
why this must in principle be so. Much of the rationale that the Court applies to computer 
programs could just as validly be argued for other literary works but for the fact that it is 
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precluded by the relevant legislation. The distinction therefore, begins to look somewhat 
arbitrary. 
  
Of related and equal significance is the fact that the Court takes a broader interpretation of the 
word ‘sale’ than is traditionally seen in discussion of exhaustion. The CJEU held that in 
situations such as the one at issue in this case, there is little real difference between a user 
downloading a program in exchange for a fee and one purchasing a copy of the program in 
CD-ROM or some other physical medium, therefore online distribution can indeed constitute 
a ‘first sale’.177 The Court also agreed with the Advocate General’s view that the 
conventional narrow interpretation undermines the exhaustion principle by making it too easy 
to circumvent.178 
 
This is the exact opposite to the position taken by the InfoSoc Directive and the WCT. Since 
this case is based on a different piece of legislation, there is no direct contradiction. However, 
it does lead to wider inconsistency regarding the scope and application of the exhaustion 
principle. And it certainly raises the possibility that the principle on the whole may be prone 
to wider application than provided for in the InfoSoc Directive  
 
This case, therefore, strikes at the very heart of the primary justifications for exhaustion not 
applying online. Even if one interprets the case as simply an exception to the general rule or 
specific to its own facts, that such an exception should be made indicates that the principle of 
exhaustion is important enough on its own merits that its application should be valued over 
slavish adherence to the tangibility requirement and the strict definition of ‘sale’. 
 
What this case highlights, therefore, is that while the conventional approach to copyright in 
online environments precludes the application of the exhaustion principle, the less restrictive 
approach that the Computer Programs Directive allows that there is a principled justification 
for giving broader scope to the exhaustion principle, and the argument that its application to 
online activities is infeasible or irreconcilable with its defining aspects becomes significantly 
weakened. What we see is that there is some acceptance in principle that exhaustion can and 
should apply online, albeit restricted to the legislation which allows for this. 
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6. Exhaustion v New Public: A 
Comparison 
There are a number of parallels which can be drawn between the ‘new public’ rule as it has 
emerged from Svensson and the wider principle of exhaustion. This may be problematic 
given that the communication right which is subject to the ‘new public’ rule is contained in 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, which explicitly excludes the application of exhaustion.179 
 
This chapter will examine some of these similarities, as well as the crucial differences 
between the two with the aim of ascertaining just how connected they really are, both 
functionally and in principle. 
 
6.1 Similarities 
Some commentators have seen the new public rule as a ‘back door’ way of introducing 
exhaustion to online situations180 but as stated above, very little further analysis has been 
conducted into this assertion. 
 
“Once the right holders have authorised the initial communication, their entitlement to 
control the retransmission of the same content through the same technical means and to the 
same audience ceases to exist. This takes us back to the very core of the exhaustion 
doctrine.”181  
 
The key similarity is that both these rules relate to subsequent actions taken in relation to 
copyright protected content following an action made by or authorised by the rightholder. 
Exhaustion is dependent on the work having been put into circulation initially, only 
subsequent circulation can be subject to exhaustion. Similarly, the ‘new public’ relies on their 
being an ‘initial public’. Svensson frequently refers to the actions authorised by the rightolder 
as an ‘initial communication’. Linguistically speaking, it is easy to see the parallels between 
this and a ‘first communication’ principle equivalent to that of the first sale. 
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A further parallel can be drawn between the ‘market’ in the first sale doctrine and the ‘public’ 
in the communication right. Both represent the indeterminate bodies of consumers and other 
third parties who will receive the copyrighted content. An important aspect of IP law is that 
IPR allows rightholders to control how these third parties are exposed to their content, and it 
is implicit that such exposure should occur in order for IP to be properly utilised. Therefore 
these bodies of third parties are crucial to a proper assessment of any IPR. 
 
In the case of exhaustion, once goods are placed on a market the rights become exhausted 
within that market, meaning that anyone within that market is entitled to buy or sell those 
goods without the authorisation of the right holder. The right is considered exhausted for the 
market as a whole, not merely the persons within it who happen to come into contact with the 
specific goods. The rightholder does, however, maintain the right to first sale in other 
markets. Similarly, when content is communicated to a public, the right to control subsequent 
re-communication to anyone within that public becomes extinguished (arguably, exhausted), 
even if those specific individuals did not actually receive the initial communication, while the 
right to communicate to a new public remains the exclusive purview of the rightholder. 
 
6.2 Common Ground – Implied License  
It must also be noted that both of these rules have also drawn comparisons with the doctrine 
of implied license. The relationship between implied license and exhaustion has already been 
discussed above. 
 
As far as the communication right and the ‘new public’ is concerned, it is the notion of 
content being made freely available without restriction measures that have become the focus 
of implied license comparisons.182 This comparison is not purely theoretical, as implied 
licence has been used by national courts183 as the basis for the application of copyright to 
linking. 
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In more abstract terms, the notion of a public that was or was not ‘taken into account by the 
rightholder’ has been said to suggest that the second part of the ‘communication to the 
public’ test is a subjective one. “This has potentially made the copyright holder’s consent a 
crucial factor in determining who formed the initial ‘public’ for the purposes of the initial 
communication of the work”.184 
 
There are numerous practical similarities between the exhaustion principle and the ‘new 
public’ rule, to the point where it is not unthinkable to view them as functionally the same 
basic idea. Combined with the conceptual bridge between them offered by the implied license 
comparison, one begins to see a very clear overlap between the two. 
 
6.3 Problems with this overlap 
If the ‘new public’ rule were to be viewed as an application of the exhaustion principle, 
however, this would not be without its problems. 
 
While one can plausibly treat the market and the public as equivalent entities, it is more 
difficult to equate the actions of sale and communication, which have always been formulated 
as distinct rights. The doctrine of exhaustion has always concerned itself primarily, if not 
exclusively, with sales and to transplant it to another right would not be wholly appropriate. 
While there is some precedent for this to be found in the ‘first download’ rule that emerged 
from UsedSoft, it is important to remember that the Court and other policymakers have been 
very adamant that this is a lex specialis born out of the strong functional similarities between 
digital distribution of computer programs and traditional sales.  It is therefore highly unlikely 
that introducing ‘back door exhaustion’ was the intention of the court in Svensson. 
 
6.3.1 Article 3(3) 
Even if we are to accept that the argument that exhaustion ‘should not’ or ‘cannot’ apply 
online is flawed, the fact that it ‘does not’ apply still remains settled law in all but certain 
very specific circumstances, since the very provision upon which the ‘new public’ is based 
explicitly excludes the application of exhaustion. 
                                                
184 A. Baker, “EU Copyright Directive: can a hyperlink be a “communication to the public”” CTLR 2014, 20(4), 
100-103, pg 102 
 44 
 
One of the biggest problems with treating the ‘new public’ rule as an expression of the 
exhaustion principle is that this analysis faces direct opposition from the vast majority of 
copyright policymakers, who have ardently refused to recognise or enable any application of 
exhaustion online, except in the case of computer programs which is regarded as a lex 
specialis. 
 
More tangibly, this is problematic because it is inconsistent with the InfoSoc Directive, which 
forms the vary basis for the communication right. Article 3(3) states: 
 
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of 
communication to the public or making available to the public as set out in this Article. 
 
This means that, according to legislation, exhaustion does not and cannot apply to the right of 
communication. Any communication made or authorised by the right holder will not exhaust 
their exclusive right to control subsequent communications. Yet nonetheless, Svensson does 
mean that the right to control subsequent communications to the same initial public is 
extinguished upon the making of an initial communication. To say that the right is 
‘extinguished’ or ‘no longer applicable’ rather than ‘exhausted’ seems purely semantic. 
Therefore it is entirely possible that Svensson is in fact incompatible with Article 3(3).   
 
This then leads us to the situation where the application of Article 3 is inherently self-
contradictory. If the ‘new public’ is part of 3(1), then it is in effect introducing a situation that 
is functionally almost identical to that which 3(3) exists solely to prevent. It follows that the 
only consistent interpretation of Article 3 is one by which the ‘new public’ rule also does not 
apply online, which would mean acknowledgement of what has been established above: that 
the ‘new public’ rule is not technology neutral. Under this model, if linking were to continue 
to be regarded as a communication to the public this would mean that each individual link 
would be required to be authorised by the rightholder of the content being linked to, assuming 
that content is protected by IPR. This situation is, as previously stated, “absurd” and does not 
appropriately reflect the balance of interest between the rightholder and the freedom of the 
internet. This in turn would mean that the InfoSoc Directive, as properly interpreted by the 
CJEU, has failed to provide an adequate framework for the protection of copyright in online 
environments. 
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It may be then that the approach taken by the German court in Paperboy, whereby linking is 
not regarded as a communication to the public but can only be considered an infringement if 
the link directs to already illegal content, is a more appropriate means of reaching the same 
substantive result.  
6.3.2 Historical Dissonance 
There is also the issue that the ‘new public’ rule, in its similarities with the exhaustion 
principle, is irreconcilable with its historical origins in SGAE. While this is less damning than 
the potential inconsistencies with Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, it does potentially 
undermine the reasoning that the court used to reach its decision in Svensson. 
 
The original application of the ‘new public’ rule was in fact the exact opposite of exhaustion: 
It was specifically designed to enable fragmentation of the ‘public’ in order to strengthen the 
IPR holders rights, while exhaustion (at least in the EU) was designed to prevent 
fragmentation for the benefit of the internal market. From this perspective, the ‘new public’ 
cannot be the same thing as exhaustion because of those origins. The CJEU could not 
possibly have had exhaustion, or something with an equivalent effect to exhaustion, in mind 
when they devised this rule. 
 
As mentioned preciously, the ‘new public’ as it applies to Svensson and the ‘new public’ in 
its original versions are also in many ways opposites of each other, so it follows that 
Svensson’s ‘new public’ more closely resembles an online version of exhaustion than it does 
an online version of the old ‘new public’ rule. But if you treat the rules as separate, this 
means that Svensson’s version really is entirely novel, which was probably not the court’s 
intention, and the reasoning behind its introduction is fundamentally flawed. 
 
This leads to the situation where the ‘new public’ in Svensson doesn’t really sit well within 
the existing framework. It is not problematic that the same rule can have different results in 
different situations, though this case where the fundamental purpose of the rule is the exact 
opposite of itself is more than a little odd. That Svensson’s ‘new public’ rule is based on a 
rule that is entirely unlike exhaustion does not seem like sufficient justification for its 
existence especially where it might otherwise be incompatible with Article 3(3).    
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7. Conclusion 
Ultimately, however, the equation of the ‘new public’ rule with the exhaustion principle only 
really works at rather high levels of abstraction. Policymakers and legislation continue to be 
adamant that exhaustion does not apply online and that UsedSoft is a lex specialis. Therefore 
they will continue to deny that the ‘new public’ rule is an application of exhaustion at all, as 
opposed to a simple aspect of the communication right which is what it was intended to be. 
 
There are enough similarities to suggest that the new public rule does not sit entirely right 
with the explicit exclusion of exhaustion contained in Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
Yet similar issues can be taken with the the lex specialis of UsedSoft, which still doesn’t fit 
entirely well with the assertion that exhaustion does not apply online anyway, since it doesn’t 
convincingly stem from a substantive difference in circumstance but simply that the 
Computer Programs directive did not exclude it when every other copyright instrument did. 
Furthermore, the ‘new public’ rule itself was born out of an earlier version of itself even 
though that earlier version was functionally the exact opposite. Therefore, the parallels 
between the ‘new public’ and exhaustion are not any more problematic than other existing 
aspects of the copyright regime and is probably not that irreconcilable with Article 3(3). 
 
However, it does speak of a few kinks in the copyright system whenever it interacts with 
online environments, which suggests that perhaps the framework of copyright is flexible 
enough to function on the internet but perhaps not as elegant in its technological neutrality as 
it aims to be.  
 
In summation, this examination of the Svensson ruling in relation to the principle of 
exhaustion is unlikely to undermine the framework of copyright regulation within the EU, 
however it does demonstrate some existing flaws and particularities within the system. 
Copyright aims to create a technologically neutral set of laws in order to adapt itself to online 
situations, and the Svensson ruling follows that objective in such a way as to provide a very 
satisfactory balance between the competing interests of rightolder protection and internet 
freedom by using exiting rules from the analogue world as a basis to create new ones. It aims 
to clarify the relationship between copyright linking in a normative sense by establishing that 
linking does, indeed, constitute a communication to the public while effectively using the 
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‘new public’ rule as a counterbalance this in order to achieve an optimum level of protection. 
It is in the application of the exhaustion principle, however, that these flaws become 
apparent. The practical overlap between the ‘new public’ requirement and the exhaustion 
principle is made apparent through the analysis in this essay, and is difficult to reconcile in 
principle with the current copyright rules which are overly restrictive on exhaustion. There 
does exist far greater scope in principle for further application of the exhaustion principle 
online than is currently recognised, which may be more consistent within itself as well as 
more compatible with the notion of technological neutrality, though the full implications of 
this would have to be further explored. The problems posed by these particular aspects of the 
current system are nonetheless not to be overstated. The ‘new public’ rule as it is might not fit 
in perfectly within the existing norms of the copyright system, but it does provide a nice 
balance between respect for the importance and freedom of linking while protecting 
rightholders from genuinely objectionable communications of their work. 
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